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ABSTRACT
This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereign
default may be associated with a subsequent decline in international trade either because creditors want
to deter default by debtors, or because trade finance dries up after default. To estimate the effect, I use an
empirical gravity model of bilateral trade and a large panel data set covering fifty years and over 200
trading partners. The model controls for a host of factors that influence bilateral trade flows, including
the incidence of IMF programs. Using the dates of sovereign debt renegotiations conducted through the
Paris Club as a proxy measure for sovereign default, I find that renegotiation is associated with an
economically and statistically significant decline in bilateral trade between a debtor and its creditors. The
decline in bilateral trade is approximately eight percent a year and persists for around fifteen years.
Andrew K. Rose








I:  Introduction 
  Why do countries pay their international debts?  Three reasons are typically proposed.  
First, countries that renege on their debts may have their overseas assets seized by foreign 
creditors.  Second, countries with poor repayment reputations may be cut off from capital flows 
in the future.  Third, delinquent countries may suffer reduced benefits of international trade.  
While all three penalties are of interest, this paper is concerned with the last explanation.  The 
first sanction is of limited potency for net debtors with little foreign collateral.  A number of 
economists (most visibly Bulow and Rogoff) have disputed the importance of future exclusion 
from capital markets.  The third explanation is widely accepted, but has never been quantified.  
The objective of this paper is to estimate empirically the effect of sovereign debt renegotiations 
on international trade. 
  There are at least two reasons why international default may reduce trade in principle.  
First, trade credit may naturally shrink after default.  Alternatively, creditors may wish to punish 
default with reduced trade benefits, in order to discourage future default, or default by third 
parties.  In practice, default seems to be strongly associated with reduced trade.  I use a large 
panel data set covering over 200 trading partners over fifty years of data to estimate a ￿gravity￿ 
model of trade.  I show that debt renegotiation is associated with a decline in bilateral trade that 
is both economically and statistically significant, adding up to a year￿s worth of trade, although 
the effect is spread over fifteen years. 
  The next section presents a theoretical framework to frame the relationship between 
sovereign default and international trade, while the third section presents the institutional setting 
of sovereign default through debt renegotiations at the Paris Club.  Next, the empirical 
methodology and data set are discussed.  The actual empirical results are presented in the fifth  3
section, which includes sensitivity analysis.  The paper finishes with some suggestions for future 
work and a brief conclusion. 
 
II:  Why Might Sovereign Default Affect Trade? 
There is a large literature on the issue of sovereign default; Eaton and Fernandez (1995) 
and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 6) provide recent surveys.  However, little of it has been 
explicitly concerned with the interaction between default and trade.  In this section, I provide a 
theoretical framework for the empirical analysis that follows. 
  There are two reasons why sovereign default could affect trade.  The more interesting 
reason is that a creditor may want to discourage further default (either by the debtor in the future 
or by other debtors), with a punishing decline in trade.  The more banal reason is that default 
may naturally result in a drying up of short-term trade credit, the vehicle used to finance most 
international trade.  In practice, it is difficult and, for my purposes, unimportant, to differentiate 
between these explanations.  I explore both briefly below. 
 
Restriction of Trade as an Inducement for Debt Repayment 
While the literature provides strong hints that restricted international trade can be used to 
encourage debt repayment, formal modeling is relatively rare.
1  It is not my intention to provide a 
full-fledged model of the interaction between sovereign default and trade.  Rather, I provide two 
intuitive examples of how sovereign default might be punished by a reduction in international 
trade.  The first example involves multiple debtors; the creditor restricts trade to punish the 
defaulter and thereby deter default by other countries.  The second example involves only a 
single debtor; trade restrictions are used to deter future default.  4
 
Trade Restrictions to Deter Default by Other Debtors
2 
Suppose there are N + 1 countries, of which one is the creditor country and the other are 
borrowing countries.  Trade between the creditor and debtor n generates surplus of 2T(Xnt) in 
period t if trade is unconstrained, where Xnt is the economic state of n at time t.  For 
convenience, assume the surplus is evenly divided between the creditor and the debtor.  Each 
period, the borrow must repay d to the creditor (i.e., service its debt).  If d is not repaid, then the 
creditor can restrict trade, reducing the surplus per country to knT(Xnt), where 0 < kn < 1.  The 
timing within a period is that debtors simultaneously decide to repay or not, then the creditor 
decides whether to take actions against delinquent debtors. 
Assume that Xnt is randomly and, for convenience, independently determined each period 
from an interval that we normalize to be [0,1].  Let S(X) be the survival function (one minus the 
distribution function).  Assume T is an increasing function and that T(0) = 0.  Let δ  be the 
common discount factor.  For convenience, assume all debtors are identical. 
Consider the following strategies for the countries: 
•  Creditor:  Provided it has maintained its reputation to punish, then, in the interactions 
with each debtor, set kn = 1 if repaid that period, otherwise set it to kn = k* < 1 (i.e., 
punish). If it has failed to maintain its reputation, then set kn = 1 regardless of repayment. 
•  Debtor: If the creditor has always punished non-repayers or there has yet to be an 
instance of non-repayment, then repay if T ￿ d > k*T and default otherwise. If the 
creditor has ever failed to punish non-repayers, then default regardless of T. 
If the creditor fails to punish, then the rest of the game is clearly subgame perfect: the 
creditor anticipates that it can not affect debtors￿ behavior, so there is no point to punishment,  5
given that punishing also punishes the creditor.  Without punishment, there is no motive to repay 
(and hence, no debt). 
It is only required to verify that the strategies can be equilibrium strategies.  If the debtor 
believes that the creditor will punish, then the strategy for the debtor is clearly rational.  For the 
creditor, the question is whether to suffer the short-run cost of punishing to maintain its 
reputation. Let π  denote that probability of repayment on the equilibrium path if the penalty is 
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So the question is whether T(E) + V0 < k*T(E) + V, for all E < E*.  This is equivalent to 
asking whether T(E*) + V0 < k*T(E*) + V, since T is an increasing function. It can be shown  6
that if there exists a k* such that π  > ‰, then there is an N such that this inequality holds; that is, 
such that punishing is a credible threat. 
Thus, the creditor uses trade restrictions to punish the defaulting country, and thereby 
deter default by other debtors. 
 
 
Trade Restrictions to Deter Future Default by the Same Debtor
3 
An alternative reason why creditors may restrict trade is to deter future default by the 
same debtor.  It is easy to analyze this phenomenon in a repeated game of loan repayment.  
Suppose there are two players, a creditor and a debtor.  Before the game in period 0, the creditor 
decides whether to make a loan to the debtor.  Naturally a loan is not made if in the subsequent 
repayment game there is no equilibrium with repayment.  In each period of the repayment game, 
the debtor chooses whether to service his debt (￿Pay￿) or renegotiate the debt (￿Default￿).  The 
creditor simultaneously chooses whether to engage in free international trade (￿Trade￿) or to 
restrict trade (￿Restrict￿). 
The creditor prefers to be paid, the debtor prefers to default, and both prefer to trade 
freely.  This can be depicted by the game, with payoffs for (Debtor, Creditor): 
 
 Trade  Restrict 
Pay  1,2 -1,x 
Default  2,0 0,-2 
-2 < x < 2 
 
While the unique Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game is (Default,Trade), standard folk 
theorems (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) imply that any feasible payoff pair that is individually 
rational (i.e., gives each player at least the minmax that they could guarantee themselves) is an  7
equilibrium payoff of the infinitely repeated game with sufficiently players (i.e., discount rate δ 
close enough to 1).  In this game the minmax is (0,0) and, in particular, (1,2) can be sustained by 
the carrot-stick equilibrium in which (Pay, Trade) is played along the equilibrium path and 
deviations are punished by playing (Default, Restrict) for an appropriate number of periods.
4 
  The drawback of such a model is that in equilibrium, no punishments should be observed.  
In the spirit of Green and Porter (1984) one can therefore allow for imperfect observability 
(although of a different form).  In particular consider a model with two states, Good and Bad, 
where it is very costly for the debtor to service debt in the bad state.  The payoffs are as above, 
except that the debtor￿s payoffs when paying are reduced by some large M.  The creditor cannot 
verify the state, although naturally the debtor observes the state.  The state is independently 
drawn each period, where Good has a probability p in (p*,1).
5 
  The equilibrium above can be simply modified to be a perfect public equilibrium 
(Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin, 1994) in which punishments are observed along the equilibrium 
path.  In particular, for appropriate values of δ<1, p*<1 and M, then the above will not be an 
equilibrium, since the debtor will default.  Nevertheless, it will be equilibrium for the debtor to 
pay except in bad states, and to default in bad states.  Default results in a single period of (Pay, 
Trade) followed by a punishment phase, which is a certain number of periods of (Default, 
Restrict).
6  Thus, the equilibrium path will involve intervals of (Pay, Trade), broken by a period 
of (Default, Trade) which is then punished by an interval of (Default, Restrict) and then either a 
return to (Pay, Trade) (with probability p) or, with probability (1-p) to another (Default, Trade), 
instigating another (Default, Restrict).
7 
Thus, in this example the creditor uses trade restrictions to punish the defaulting country, 
and thereby deter future default by the debtor.  8
 
Default and Trade Credit 
  The two examples show that it is possible that trade restrictions can be used to punish and 
deter default. But a fall in trade after sovereign default need not be a deliberate overt act of 
retaliation.  Indeed, as a result of sovereign default or risk creditor countries have never, to my 
knowledge, used formal legal sanctions.
8  Instead, any negative effect may be simply the result 
of the drying-up of short-term trade credit.
9 
Kaletsky (1985, pp 36-38) argues: ￿The interruption of trade finance might turn out to be 
the heaviest penalty for a defaulter.  Trade finance is a critical issue because most trade is 
conducted on a credit basis of one kind or another ￿ trade finance could be the Achilles￿ heel of 
a default strategy.￿
10  Consistent with this, Cohen (1991, p1) states: ￿A defaulting country first 
loses access to its trade credit￿ Trade, in general, becomes difficult, exporting is tricky, and so 
is paying for its imports.￿  Rogoff (1999, p 31) writes ￿The strongest weapon of disgruntled 
creditors, perhaps, is the ability to interfere with short-term credits that are the lifeblood of 
international trade.￿  Alternatively, insurance rates for international trade (especially those 
offered by official agencies) may rise as a result of default.
11  Thus, there are reasons to expect a 





  It is not necessary to argue that reduced international trade is the only deterrent to 
sovereign default; the ￿pure reputation￿ effects disputed by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a,b) and 
Kletzer and Wright (2000) may also be present.  Nevertheless, there is little evidence that  9
alternative mechanisms are very important.  For instance, Lindert and Morton (1989, p 231) 
examine historical rate of returns and find ￿A clear result from the history of rates of return on 
sovereign debt relates to the ex post treatment of those who fell into arrears: The only ones 
punished were few countries defaulting in isolation before 1918.  The majority of non repayers 
￿escaped￿ punishment￿￿ They later argue (p 234): ￿Countries that had defaulted in the past were 
significantly more likely to become problem debtors again.  Yet defaulting governments have 
seldom been punished, either with direct sanctions or with discriminatory denial of later 
credit.￿
13 
  It seems clear that there are reasons to believe that sovereign default may lead to a 
decline in international trade, either as a punishment for and deterrent to further default, or 
simply because of more costly trade finance and/or insurance.  For my purposes, all that is 
important is that there is some reason for debtors to fear the consequences of default for their 
international trade.  Whether there is any significant linkage in practice is ultimately an empirical 
question.  I now turn to that task.  First, it is important to discuss the institutional setting of 
sovereign default. 
 
III:  Sovereign Debt Renegotiation in Practice 
  In practice, it is rare for a country simply to default on (let alone repudiate) its 
international financial obligations.  Instead, it typically renegotiates its debts, usually through the 
￿Paris Club.￿  In this section, I provide a brief overview of the debt renegotiation process.  More 
information on the Paris Club is provided by Sevigny (1990), Eichengreen and Portes (1995), 
and the website of the Paris Club.
14  10
  The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors that meets approximately ten 
times a year to discuss issues associated with external debts of developing countries, and 
renegotiate these debts.
15  The Paris Club began with the 1956 renegotiation of Argentina￿s 
external debt, and has since reached over 335 agreements with over 75 debtor countries; these 
collectively total over $375 billion.  The French Treasury provides a small secretariat for the 
club. 
The Paris Club is informal and has no legal basis or status; instead it adheres to a set of 
principles.  Three of the key principles are particularly germane.  First, all decisions by creditors 
are taken by consensus, ensuring ￿creditor solidarity.￿  Second, the Paris Club preserves 
￿comparability of treatment￿ between all creditors.  In particular, it is expected that Paris Club 
members, non-members, and private creditors (notably banks) be treated comparably by the 
debtor country, to ensure equitable burden sharing.  The only exceptions are the international 
financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank that are treated as preferred, though they 
are often expected to provide new money.  Third, the Paris Club prefers that deals be negotiated 
only for countries that are engaged in an IMF-approved program, complete with appropriate 
conditionality.   
The relationship with the IMF is important.  An IMF program is a litmus test for 
￿imminent default,￿ and thus ensures that renegotiation is warranted.  More importantly, an IMF 
program is a means to implementing the reforms required to resolve the underlying payments 
difficulties.  Thus an IMF program usually precedes a Paris Club deal.  But the dance is 
complicated, since the IMF typically agrees to a program only with the implicit assurance from 
the Paris Club that temporary debt relief from the creditors will be forthcoming, in order to 
ensure IMF repayment.
16  11
  Paris Club agreements apply to public sector debt as well as private debt guaranteed by 
the public sector.
17  The debts considered are only those granted before a ￿cutoff date￿ which is 
not changed in subsequent negotiations; this division of debts is intended to help restoration of 
the flow of credit.  It is important to note that only medium and long-term debts (which 
constitute over 80% of all developing country debt) are rescheduled.
18  To quote the Paris Club: 
￿Short term debt (debt with a maturity of one year or less) is excluded from the treatments, as 
their restructuring can create a significant disruption of the capacity of the debtor country to 
participate in international trade.￿
19  The overt attempt by the Paris Club to protect trade from 
default is an additional reason why determining the relationship between trade and default is 
essentially an empirical matter. 
Paris Club membership is open to all creditor governments that accept its practices.  
However, while developing countries occasionally participate in the negotiations, the core 
members are large OECD countries.
20  In order to reduce the costs of renegotiation, only creditor 
countries with debts exceeding a small ￿de minimis￿ level negotiate (creditors sometimes 
participate as observers if their levels are lower than the de minimis level). Thus, participation 
varies with both the debtor and time.  The Paris Club operates quickly in practice; negotiations 
begin soon after an IMF program begins and are typically concluded within six to eight 
months.
21 
The Paris Club provides four different types of renegotiation.  ￿Classic terms￿ include: 
five years of grace; semi-annual principal repayment terms in years six to ten; and a moratorium 
interest rate which is designed to keep the net present value of the debt intact.  Three sets of 
additional terms have been made available more recently; all involve a grant element that 
reduces the net present value of the debt.  ￿Toronto terms￿ were created in 1988 to facilitate debt  12
reduction for very low-income countries.  These were superceded in 1991 by ￿London terms￿ 
which were in turn replaced in 1994 by ￿Naples terms.￿ ￿Houston terms￿ were created in 1990 
for low-middle income countries.  In 1996 the HIPC initiative (for Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries) became available under ￿Lyon Terms￿ which were subsequently modified to 
￿Cologne terms￿.  In this paper I use only ￿classic￿ Paris Club agreements, which account for the 
majority of all Paris Club deals.  Since they do not involve any (intended) grant element, they are 
most appropriate in isolating any effects of debt renegotiations on trade.  (It would be interesting 
to investigate Paris Club deals with a grant element, although the small sample size makes this a 
difficult endeavor at present). 
Paris Club agreements seem to be the most appropriate dates for measuring sovereign 
default.  The only potential alternative dating scheme would use the onset of arrears of 
international payments of interest, principal, or both.  This seems an inferior measure.  There 
were 283 Paris Club deals through 1997 (some of which were not ￿classic￿), and 163 spells of 
arrears that together spanned some 2000 country-year observations.  The overlap between the 
onset of arrears and Paris Club deals is poor, even within a year or two.  While some of the 
arrears spells were clearly defaults, some were officially or quietly encouraged so that the arrears 
were strictly technical (e.g., between an IMF program and the conclusion of a Paris Club deal; 
see Dooley, 2000).  Further, arrears were rarely absolute; partial debt service was routinely 
continued during periods of arrears and was usually comparable to (or higher than) the size of 
arrears.  This makes it difficult to measure the nature and scope of default simply though using 
the presence of arrears.  Further, arrears is a multilateral concept, whereas Paris Club information 
is available on a bilateral basis.  For all these reasons, I use the dates of Paris Club deals to date 
sovereign debt renegotiation, though I do use the presence of arrears as a sensitivity check.
22  13
 
IV:  Empirical Methodology and Data 
Estimation Strategy 
I use a conventional gravity model to model bilateral trade flows, augmented with a 
number of extra controls: 
 
ln(Xijt) = β 0 + β 1ln(YiYj)t + β 2ln(YiYj/PopiPopj)t + β 3lnDij + β 4Langij + β 5Contij  
+ β 6FTAijt + β 7Landlij + β 8Islandij +β 9ln(AreaiAreaj) + β 10ComColij   
+ β 11CurColijt  + β 12Colonyij  + β 13ComNatij + β 14CUijt  
+ β 15,0IMFijt + Σ Kβ 15,kIMFijt-k + φ RENEGijt + Σ Mφ mRENEGijt-m + ε ijt 
 
where i and j denotes countries, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as: 
•  Xijt denotes the average value of real bilateral trade between i and j at time t, 
•  Y is real GDP, 
•  Pop is population, 
•  Dij is the distance between i and j, 
•  Lang is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a common language, 
•  Cont is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border, 
•  FTA is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same regional trade 
agreement, 
•  Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair dyad (0, 1, or 2). 
•  Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2), 
•  Area is the land mass of the country,  14
•  ComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with the 
same colonizer, 
•  CurCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t, 
•  Colony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa, 
•  ComNat is a binary variable which is unity if i and j remained part of the same nation during 
the sample (e.g., France and Guadeloupe, or the UK and Bermuda), 
•  CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t, 
•  IMF is one/two if one/both of i or/and j began an IMF program at t and zero otherwise, 
•  RENEG is a binary variable which is unity if i and j renegotiated international debt at time t 
and zero otherwise, 
•  K and M are unknown lag lengths, 
•  β  are a set of nuisance coefficients, and 
•  ε  represents the myriad other influences on bilateral trade, assumed to be well behaved. 
 
The coefficients of interest to me are {φ }, the effect of current and lagged debt renegotiations 
on trade. 
I estimate the model with both fixed and random effects panel data estimators.  The fixed-
effects (￿within￿) estimator is equivalent to adding a comprehensive set of (11,178) country pair-
specific intercepts to the estimating equation.  This ensures consistent estimation of φ  under a 
wide range of circumstances, but may not be efficient.
23  GLS/random-effects (￿variance 




The Data Set 
The trade data used in this paper is taken from the ￿Direction of Trade￿ data set 
developed in CD-ROM form by the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the same data set is 
used by Glick and Rose (2002).  The data set covers bilateral trade between all 217 entities 
measured by the IMF between 1948 and 1997 (thought many observations are missing).   Not all 
of the trading partners are ￿countries￿ in the conventional sense of the word; colonies (e.g., 
Bermuda), territories (e.g., Guam), overseas departments (e.g., Guadeloupe), countries that 
gained their independence (e.g., Guinea-Bissau), and so forth are all included.  I use the term 
￿country￿ simply for convenience.  The countries are listed in Appendix 1.  Bilateral trade on 
FOB exports and CIF imports is recorded in American dollars; I deflate trade by the American 
CPI.
25  I create an average value of bilateral trade between a pair of countries by averaging all 
four trade flows available.
26 
To this data set, I add a number of other variables that are necessary to estimate the 
gravity model.  Population and real GDP data (in constant dollars) are taken from three sources.  
Wherever possible, I use ￿World Development Indicators￿ (taken from the World Bank￿s WDI 
2000 CD-ROM) data.  When the data are unavailable from the World Bank, I fill in missing 
observations with comparables from the Penn World Table Mark 5.6, and (when all else fails), 
from the IMF￿s ￿International Financial Statistics￿.
27  The series have been checked and 
corrected for errors. 
I exploit the CIA￿s ￿World Factbook￿ for a number of country-specific variables.  These 
include: latitude and longitude, land area (in square kilometers), landlocked and island status, 
physically contiguous neighbors, language, colonizers, and dates of independence.
28  I use these 
to create great-circle distance (in miles) and other controls.  I obtain data from the World Trade  16
Organization to create an indicator of regional trade agreements, and include: EEC/EC/EU; US-
Israel FTA; NAFTA; CARICOM; PATCRA; ANZCERTA; and Mercosur.
29  Currency union 
pairs are taken from Glick and Rose (2002). 
  The Paris Club￿s website provides data on all agreements including: the date; the cutoff 
date; the type of treatment (Classic/Naples, etc.); the list of participating creditor and observer 
countries; the amount of debt treated; the current status of the agreement; and so forth.  I use 
these data in order to construct my dummy variable for debt renegotiations, RENEG, which is 
unity in the year when a creditor-debtor pair was involved in a Paris Club deal and zero 
otherwise.
30 
￿Classic￿ Paris Club agreements are almost always conditioned on IMF programs; in my 
sample, over eighty percent of Paris Club agreements coincide with an IMF program signed in 
the same year.
31  However, not all IMF programs are associated with Paris Club agreements.  
Indeed, while there were 283 Paris Club deals though 1997 (of which 163 were ￿classic￿), there 
were 898 IMF programs initiated during the same time.  (Of these, over 80% (739) were ￿Stand-
bys Arrangements,￿ designed to address short-term payments imbalances.
32)  Since the 
implementation of an IMF program is often associated with economic trauma and/or reform, it is 
important to condition on the existence of an IMF program in determining the additional 
marginal effect of any debt renegotiations.
33  My variable, IMFijt is a dummy variable that is 
unity if either country i or j initiated an IMF program (of any type) during year t.  It takes on a 
value of two if both i and j begin an IMF program in the year, and zero otherwise. 
  Descriptive statistics for the variables are provided in Appendix 2, along with OLS 
coefficients from a simple regression of the log of trade on the contemporaneous regressors (and 
an unrecorded intercept); Appendix 3 tabulates simple bivariate correlations.  It is interesting to  17
note that the OLS coefficient for renegotiation is positive.  Negative estimates (which are 
presented below) manifestly depend on a more sophisticated estimator that takes into account the 
panel nature of the data set.  It is also worth noting that the simple correlation between Paris 
Club negotiations and trade is positive; any negative effect relies on conditioning and/or a more 
sophisticated estimator.  Further, the incidence of bilateral Paris Club negotiations has only low 
correlations with the other (nuisance) variables.  While the correlations are statistically 
significant given the sample size, none exceeds .1 in magnitude.
34 
 
V:  Empirical Results 
Benchmark Results 
  Benchmark results are reported in Table 1.  In the middle of the table, I tabulate fixed- 
and random-effects estimates for an empirical model with contemporaneous and fifteen lags of 
the dummy variable for debt renegotiation, five lags of IMF program inception (i.e., K=5, 
M=15). 
  The model works well in a number of senses.  The standard ￿gravity￿ effects are present; 
countries that are further apart geographically trade less, while larger and richer pairs of 
countries trade more.  Countries that share a common currency, a common language, a common 
border, or membership in a regional free trade agreement trade more.  Landlocked countries and 
islands trade less, and most of the colonial effects are large and positive.  Almost all these effects 
are economically and statistically significant.  The model also explains a reasonable percentage 
of the data variation.  The inception of IMF programs is associated with a drop in bilateral trade 
of about ten percent, holding other things equal.  This effect is economically and statistically  18
large, but transient.  After around three years this effect dies away, and turns slightly positive 
after five years. 
  Above and beyond all these (mostly) conventional effects on bilateral trade, debt 
renegotiations seem to have a substantial negative effect on international trade.  The effect is 
somewhat sensitive to the exact method of estimation; the fixed effects estimator indicates a 
decline of trade of about seven percent annually, while the GLS estimator shows a larger effect 
of nine percent.  Both effects are highly persistent, lasting around fifteen years at more or less 
constant levels.  While the individual φ  coefficients are often statistically insignificant because of 
multicollinearity, the hypothesis that debt renegotiations have no effect on trade can be rejected 
at any reasonable significance level.  Further, the cumulative effect of renegotiations on trade is 
also large negative and significant.  The effect averages about eight percent annually and persists 
for about fifteen years.  The two middle columns of Table 1 show that these effects are not 
especially sensitive to the exact specification of the lag length; eliminating the lags of IMF 
program inception and dropping the last five renegotiation lags does not destroy the negative 
effect of debt renegotiation on trade.  The two columns at the right demonstrate that the effect is 
smaller but still present without any lags at all. 
 
Lag Length 
  The appropriate number of lags of debt renegotiation (M) is unknown.  Does uncertainty 
about M affect any economic conclusions?  No.  Table 2 explores the effects of different lag 
lengths for the debt renegotiation variable.  To simplify the analysis, I impose equality on the 
coefficients of lagged debt renegotiations.  Thus in the left-hand columns of the top panel of 
Table 2, I tabulate the fixed- and random-effects estimates of φ k for k=1,￿,5 where a single  19
coefficient is estimated for lags of RENEG between one and five.  (Coefficients for the 
contemporaneous and 5 values of IMF program inception and the other nuisance coefficients are 
not reported.)  In the next columns to the right, I add a tenth-order term to the fifth-order term.
35  
At the extreme right of the table, I have four separate coefficients, representing lags up to twenty, 
up to fifteen, up to ten, and up to five years after debt renegotiations.  The top panel includes five 
lags of IMF program inception as well as the contemporaneous impact, while the middle panel 
reports the analogous statistics when IMF program inception is modeled as only having a 
contemporaneous effect. 
  The results indicate that debt renegotiations have a persistent effect, one that seems to last 
about fifteen years.  This result does not depend very strongly on which estimation method is 
used, or whether lags of the IMF variable are included.  The bottom panel of Table 2 confirms 
this.  It reports probability values for the hypothesis Πmφ m=0 for values of m>M, where 
M=5,10,15.  As M rises to 15, the hypothesis that an additional five lags are not required 
becomes reasonable with the within estimator (though it is more marginal with GLS).  Including 
fifteen lags of debt renegotiation and five of the IMF variable seems both intuitively and 
statistically reasonable. Still, it is inappropriate to place much confidence in the exact lag length, 
given that: a) many debt renegotiations have only taken place in the last fifteen years, and b) the 
lags seem quite long. 
In passing, I note that adding one or two leads of Paris Club renegotiation has no effect 
on the economic or statistical significance of debt renegotiation; the leads themselves are 
insignificant.  This provides further evidence that the Paris Club dates are appropriate dates for 
debt renegotiation. 
  20
Censoring, Simultaneity and Sensitivity Analysis 
   Trade is bounded below by zero, so a technique that takes this constraint into account 
may be preferable to my default estimators, which are both linear.  Thus Table 3 presents a 
random-effects panel Tobit estimator.
36  Reassuringly, the results are quite similar to those of 
Table 1 (though they are considerably more computationally demanding).
37 
  Debt renegotiation may be caused by shocks that also cause trade flows to shrink; that is, 
the estimation strategy may be biased because trade and debt renegotiation are simultaneously 
determined by some other factor that has been omitted from the statistical analysis.  While 
theoretically plausible, there is no direct evidence indicating that this issue is important in 
practice.  A long unsuccessful research program attempted to find variables systematically 
associated with sovereign default in order to create leading and contemporaneous indicators of 
default.  Babbel (1996) provides an annotated bibliography of the literature, while Eaton, 
Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) provide an earlier survey.   
Still, there is no reason in principle not to analyze regressors that are potentially 
associated with sovereign default.  I proceed by using potential causes of default as instrumental 
variables in the trade equation.  Table 3 uses three instrumental variables:  1) the government 
budget surplus/deficit (expressed as a percentage of GDP); 2) the CPI inflation rate; and 3) the 
current account surplus/deficit (percentage of GDP).  In each case I use values (for both i and j) 
of these instrumental variables for contemporaneous debt renegotiation and the onset of IMF 
programs.
38  All the regressors were taken from the World Bank￿s WDI 2000 CD-ROM.   
Reassuringly, both fixed- and random-effects indicate that simultaneity bias is not 
responsible for the negative effect of renegotiation on trade; both the joint and the cumulatively 
negative effects remain significant.  Nevertheless, the IV estimates are obtained only with a  21
dramatic reduction in observations since the macroeconomic instrumental variables are missing 
for many of the original observations.
39  Further, the instrumental variables are poor in the sense 
that they deliver imprecise estimates; while Πmφ m and Σ mφ m remain negative and significant, the 
standard errors are much larger. 
  More sensitivity analysis is presented in Table 4.  The top panel (Table 4a) performs a 
variety of sensitivity experiments with respect to the sample.  It reports probability-values for a 
key hypothesis, namely Πmφ m=0 ∀ m, as well as the point estimate of Σ mφ m, along with an 
appropriate standard error.  The statistics are reported for both fixed- and random-effects 
estimators for four different samples: 1) the default entire sample; 2) the sample without the 
1990s; 3) the sample without African observations; and 4) the sample without Latin-American 
observations.  All the evidence indicates that debt renegotiation has a statistically significant 
effect on trade, and that the cumulative effect is negative.  For one of the perturbations (when the 
fixed effects estimator is used without the 1990s), the cumulative effect is negative but with a t-
statistic of unity. 
  The bottom panel of Table 4 replaces the dates of Paris Club deals (and their lags) with 
two other measures of default.  The first measure is simply the presence of arrears.  The question 
is whether (either interest or principal) arrears in either country has a negative effect of trade, 
holding other factors constant.  I use arrears data from the Global Development Finance 2001 
CD-ROM, which provides series for 137 developing countries from 1970 through 1997.  The 
sample is thus considerably lower than that of my benchmark results, since there are no early 
observations, nor are there observations for rich or small countries.  Still, the results at the left of 
Table 4b show that the presence of arrears seems to dampen trade considerably.  The fixed 
effects estimate is eight percent, while the effect is over twenty percent with GLS.    22
The second measure I use is the log of the product of Institutional Investor country 
ratings.  These are available for 118 countries from 1979 through 1997 (though some variables 
are missing), so that the sample is again much smaller.  The country ratings are derived from 
surveys of leading banks who are asked to rank each country￿s creditworthiness on a scale from 
0 to 100 (best); Haque, Mathieson, and Mark (1997) provide more detail.  Since it is unclear 
exactly what is being measured, or how the banks are measuring it, it is important not to over-
interpret these data.  Still, it seems interesting to ask if higher creditworthiness is associated 
increased trade.  The results at the right of Table 4b show that higher country ratings are indeed 
associated with much higher trade, and thus reduced creditworthiness is associated with less 
trade.  
  To summarize: the finding that debt renegotiation seems to affect trade aversely seems 
robust to uncertainty with respect to lag lengths, censoring, simultaneity, the exact sample, and 
using arrears or Institutional Investor country ratings instead of Paris Club dates. 
 
Trade Diversion 
  There seems to be evidence that countries which default engage in less bilateral trade 
with their creditors for a number of years after renegotiation.  The costs of this reduced trade to 
the debtor may be alleviated if trade is merely diverted from creditor countries to others.  Thus it 
is important to test for trade diversion after debt renegotiation.   
I test for trade diversion by adding to the default equation, contemporaneous and lagged 
values of a dummy variable that is unity if (at least) one of the countries rescheduled its debt but 
the pair of countries was not directly involved in a renegotiation.  For instance, Albania 
rescheduled debt with Austria in 1993, but not with Australia (since Australia is a permanent  23
member of the Paris Club, this implies that its Albanian assets did not exceed the de minimis 
level).  My variable ￿RENEG￿ is one for Albania-Austria in 1993, but zero for Albania-
Australia; my variable ￿DIVERT￿ is exactly the opposite.  A positive coefficient for DIVERT 
indicates that (e.g., Albanian) trade is diverted away from creditors (e.g., Austria) towards non-
creditors (e.g., Australia). 
  Table 5 adds contemporaneous and lagged values of DIVERT.  Independent of how 
many lags of DIVERT are included, its contemporaneous value has a significantly negative 
coefficient.  Thus the trade of a debtor not only follows with its creditors at the time of 
renegotiation, it falls with other countries as well.  But it is interesting to note that this negative 
effect is much less persistent than that of RESCHED.  It turns positive within a couple of years 
using the fixed-effects estimator, and within five years using the random-effects estimator.  The 
exact results are sensitive to both the estimator and the number of lags used, so that it is not 
possible to conclude with any confidence whether or not there has been any trade diversion.  But 
it is clear that trade between debtors and non-creditors is not as dramatically affected by 
renegotiation as trade between debtors and creditors.
40  This pushes one towards the hypothesis 
that creditor countries are seeking to punish default, since trade credit might be expected to dry 
up uniformly. 
 
Differential Effects on Exports and Imports 
  Thus far the analysis has focused on total bilateral trade between a pair of countries, 
rather than on exports and imports separately.  But there is no reason why default need have the 
same effect on a defaulting country￿s exports and imports.  I explore this possibility further in 
Table 6.  24
  Table 6 is based on estimation of bilateral export flows, rather than total bilateral trade 
flows.  Instead of using a single dummy variable to indicate a Paris Club deal that involved in the 
pair of countries (and fifteen of its lags), I include two variables (and their lags); one for default 
by the exporting country, and another for default by the importer.  The other nuisance variables 
are included, and results are, as usual, reported for both fixed- and random-effects estimators. 
  The results indicate that Paris Club renegotiation has similar effects on both exporting 
and importing countries.  As is clear from the first two rows, the joint effect of the 
contemporaneous and (fifteen) lagged coefficients of renegotiation on exports is highly 
statistically significant for both estimators, while the cumulative effect is economically and 
statistically large.  The middle rows indicate that much the same effects characterize imports, 
though the cumulative effects are smaller.  At the bottom, I test two hypotheses.  The second line 
from the bottom is a test of the hypothesis that the joint effect on exports is equal to the joint 
effect of imports; that hypothesis cannot be rejected at standard significance levels.  Still, the 
cumulative effect on exports is somewhat larger than the effect on imports, as is clear from the 
last line. 
  To summarize, the effects of default on exports seem somewhat higher than those on 
imports.  Still, the most striking result is really that default has a substantive effect on trade. 
 
Other Effects 
  I have searched for other signs that debt renegotiation dampens international trade by 
examining other aspects of Paris Club deals.  However, there seems to be only weak evidence 
that the dollar size of the Paris Club deal, the length of time since the last renegotiation, or the  25




VI:  Conclusion 
  On June 15 1979, Togo renegotiated $280 million in sovereign debt through the Paris 
Club, a package that was subsequently repaid in full.  Yet Togo￿s trade with the UK (one of 
Togo￿s creditor￿s in the Paris Club) fell from $30.7 million in 1979 to $5.5 million in 1994 (after 
adjusting for inflation), a decline averaging eleven percent over fifteen years.  Togo￿s trade with 
other key creditors such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland also fell at rates 
exceeding ten percent during the same period.  Similarly, other countries renegotiating their 
debts through the Paris Club (such as Peru in 1968 and Senegal in 1982) suffered large and 
persistent trade declines (with e.g., Finland and Denmark respectively).  The question asked in 
this paper is: Has trade typically fallen after sovereign debt renegotiation, after other factors are 
taken into account? 
  The answer is positive.  Renegotiation of international debt through the Paris Club is 
associated with a decline in bilateral trade between debtors and creditors.  The reduction in trade 
is economically and statistically significant.  While the results are somewhat sensitive to the 
exact specification, trade falls by about eight percent a year for around fifteen years, after taking 
other factors into account.  That is, international default has negative consequences for trade.  
This result is robust to a number of econometric perturbations concerning lag length, treatment 
of simultaneity, censoring and sample size.  There is weak evidence of trade diversion, and the 
exports of defaulters are hit somewhat harder than imports.  26
  It would be interesting to extend this analysis to cover ￿London Club￿ negotiations 
between debtors and private sector banks.  The primary obstacle to this lies in determining the 
default dates.  London Club activity proceeds with a much longer lag than does the Paris Club, 
since the bank advisory committees require near or total unanimity from a more heterogeneous 
group than the Paris Club; Eichengreen and Portes (1995) provide more discussion. 
I have not identified whether the effect of default on international trade appear because of 
a natural shrinking of trade finance or because creditors seek to punish and deter default.  While 
both seem plausible, the evidence of trade diversion indirectly supports the 
punishment/deterrence theory.  This is another natural project for future research.  27
Table 1: Debt Renegotiation and Trade 
  Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random 
RENEG  -.06 (.04)  -.08 (.04)  -.05 (.04)  -.06 (.04)  -.07 (.03)  -.09 (.03) 
RENEG: lag 1  -.07 (.04)  -.09 (.04)  -.07 (.04)  -.09 (.04)     
RENEG: lag 2  -.06 (.04)  -.08 (.04)  -.07 (.04)  -.08 (.04)     
RENEG: lag 3  -.06 (.04)  -.07 (.04)  -.06 (.04)  -.08 (.04)     
RENEG: lag 4  -.03 (.04)  -.04 (.04)  -.03 (.04)  -.04 (.04)     
RENEG: lag 5  -.04 (.04)  -.05 (.04)  -.02 (.04)  -.04 (.04)     
RENEG: lag 6  .00 (.04)  -.02 (.04)  .00 (.04)  -.02 (.04)     
RENEG: lag 7  -.04 (.04)  -.07 (.04)  -.04 (.04)  -.07 (.04)     
RENEG: lag 8  -.06 (.04)  -.09 (.04)  -.07 (.04)  -.11 (.04)     
RENEG: lag 9  -.06 (.04)  -.09 (.04)  -.09 (.04)  -.13 (.04)     
RENEG: lag 10  -.07 (.04)  -.10 (.05)  -.11 (.04)  -.16 (.04)     
RENEG: lag 11  -.12  (.05)  -.16  (.05)      
RENEG: lag 12  -.06  (.05)  -.09  (.05)      
RENEG: lag 13  -.10  (.06)  -.13  (.06)      
RENEG: lag 14  -.09  (.06)  -.13  (.06)      
RENEG: lag 15  -.09  (.07)  -.12  (.07)      
IMF  -.09 (.01)  -.10 (.01)  -.10 (.01)  -.11 (.01)  -.10 (.01)  -.11 (.01) 
IMF: lag 1  -.02  (.01)  -.03  (.01)      
IMF: lag 2  -.01  (.01)  -.02  (.01)      
IMF: lag 3  -.01  (.01)  -.02  (.01)      
IMF: lag 4  -.00  (.01)  -.01  (.01)      
IMF: lag 5  .03  (.01)  .01  (.01)      
Log Distance   -1.4  (.03)  -1.4  (.03)  -1.3  (.03) 
Log Real GDP  .07 (.01)  .30 (.01)  .06 (.01)  .28 (.01)  .05 (.01)  .28 (.01) 
Log GDP p/c  .77 (.01)  .49 (.01)  .78 (.01)  .51 (.16)  .78 (.01)  .51 (.01) 
Language   .19  (.06)  .18  (.06)  .18  (.06) 
Border   .52  (.16)  .53  (.16)  .53  (.16) 
Regional FTA  .68 (.04)  .65 (.04)  .68 (.04)  .65 (.04)  .69 (.04)  .66 (.04) 
Landlocked   -.86  (.04)  -.86  (.04)  -.86  (.04) 
Island   -.05  (.05)  -.06  (.05)  -.06  (.05) 
Log Area   .24  (.01)  .25  (.01)  .25  (.01) 
Com. Colonizer   -.26  (.08)  -.27  (.08)  -.27  (.08) 
Cur. Colony  .37 (.09)  .44 (.09)  .37 (.09)  .43 (.09)  .37 (.09)  .44 (.09) 
Ex-Colonizer-Colony   3.2  (.20)  3.2  (.20)  3.2  (.20) 
Same Country    1.2 (.20)    1.3 (1.58)    1.3 (1.58) 
Currency Union  .64 (.05)  .68 (.05)  .64 (.01)  .69 (.05)  .64 (.05)  .69 (.05) 
P(All RENEG=0)  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000  .04  .01 
Σ RENEG  -.99 (.13)  -1.4 (.13)  -.60 (.09)  -.88 (.09)     
R
2 within  .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 
R
2 between  .25 .53 .24 .53 .24 .52 
R
2 overall  .25 .47 .24 .47 .23 .47 
Intercepts not recorded.  Standard errors in parentheses.  219,573 observations in 11,178 dyads.  28
Table 2: Varying the Lag Structure of Renegotiation 
 
Including 5 lags of IMF program 


















































Without IMF lags 


















































Are 5 Extra Lags Required? 








  Fixed GLS Fixed GLS 
Conditional on 5 
lags 
.0001 .0000 .0002 .0000 
Conditional on 
10 lags 
.0002 .0000 .0002 .0000 
Conditional on 
15 lags 
.1542 .0177 .1783 .0329 
 
Probability value for hypothesis Πφ k=0. 
Regressors not recorded include: Contemporaneous values of RENEG and IMF; currency union; 
log distance; real GDP; real GDP per capita; common language; border; regional FTA; 
landlocked; island; log area; common colonizer; current colony; ex-colony; common country; 
and intercept.   
Number of observations = 219,573 in 11,178 dyads.  29
Table 3: Estimator Sensitivity: Panel Tobit and Instrumental Variables Estimates 
 






RENEG  -.08 (.04)  -2.26 (1.52)  -9.35 (2.29) 
RENEG: lag 1  -.09 (.04)  -.24 (.06)  -.29 (.07) 
RENEG: lag 2  -.08 (.04)  .14 (.21)  1.33 (.34) 
RENEG: lag 3  -.08 (.04)  -.16 (.06)  -.28 (.07) 
RENEG: lag 4  -.05 (.04)  -.07 (.05)  .15 (.08) 
RENEG: lag 5  -.05 (.04)  -.11 (.06)  -.15 (.07) 
RENEG: lag 6  -.03 (.04)  -.11 (.06)  -.27 (.08) 
RENEG: lag 7  -.07 (.04)  -.27 (.16)  -1.02 (.23) 
RENEG: lag 8  -.10 (.04)  -.33 (.19)  -1.24 (.27) 
RENEG: lag 9  -.09 (.04)  -.15 (.07)  -.25 (.09) 
RENEG: lag 10  -.11 (.05)  -.19 (.12)  -.60 (.16) 
RENEG: lag 11  -.18 (.05)  -.29 (.19)  -1.24 (.27) 
RENEG: lag 12  -.09 (.05)  -.25 (.17)  -.97 (.23) 
RENEG: lag 13  -.13 (.06)  -.12 (.11)  -.50 (.14) 
RENEG: lag 14  -.15 (.06)  -.14 (.11)  -.51 (.15) 
RENEG: lag 15  -.14 (.07)  -.07 (.09)  -.13 (.12) 
IMF  -.11 (.01)  .14 (.17)  -.39 (.25) 
IMF: lag 1  -.03 (.01)  .03 (.03)  -.01 (.03) 
IMF: lag 2  -.02 (.01)  .01 (.01)  .04 (.02) 
IMF: lag 3  -.02 (.01)  .00 (.01)  .05 (.02) 
IMF: lag 4  -.01 (.01)  -.01 (.01)  -.01 (.016) 
IMF: lag 5  .00 (.01)  -.01 (.01)  .01 (.02) 
Log Distance  -1.47 (.02)    -1.46 (.04) 
Log Real GDP  .39 (.005)  .27 (.04)  .80 (.02) 
Log GDP p/c  .43 (.01)  .75 (.06)  .42 (.04) 
Language  .10  (.03)  .42  (.08) 
Border  -1.57 (.05)    .09 (.24) 
Regional FTA  .48 (.04)  .21 (.07)  .07 (.09) 
Landlocked  -.76 (.02)    -.50 (.07) 
Island  .24  (.02)  .06  (.07) 
Log Area  .24  (.01)  .04  (.02) 
Com. Colonizer  -.18 (.07)    .01 (.12) 
Cur. Colony  .53 (.08)  -1.39 (.47)  -.86 (.63) 
Ex-Colonizer-Colony  2.33 (.04)    2.40 (.25) 
Same Country  2.72 (.19)     
Currency Union  .68 (.06)  .00 (.30)  .83 (.28) 
P(All RENEG=0)  .0000 .0000 .0000 
Σ RENEG  -1.54 (.12)  -4.61 (2.49)  -15.3 (3.5) 
R
2 within   .02  .01 
R
2 between   .52  .64 
R
2 overall   .52  .56 
Observations  219,573 59,481  59,481 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Instrumental variables: domestic and foreign CPI inflation rates, current accounts 
and budget surplus/deficit (latter expressed as percentage of GDP).  30
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Probability values for ￿All RENEG=0;￿ coefficient values and standard error for ΣRENEG. 
Benchmark regression: Contemporaneous and 15 lags of RENEG; contemporaneous and 5 lags 
of IMF; currency union; log distance; real GDP; real GDP per capita; common language; border; 
regional FTA; landlocked; island; log area; common colonizer; current colony; ex-colony; 
common country; and intercept.   
Number of observations = 219,573 in 11,178 dyads. 
 
Table 4b: Arrears and Institutional Investor Ratings  
 
  Fixed Effects  Random Effects  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
Arrears  -.08 (.02)  -.25 (.02)     
Log Product II Ratings     .86  (.03)  1.25  (.03) 
IMF  -.09 (.01)  -.08 (.01)  -.01 (.01)  .01 (.01) 
Log Distance   -1.52  (.05)  -1.22  (.04) 
Log Real GDP  .23 (.02)  .55 (.02)  .41 (.02)  .77 (.01) 
Log GDP p/c  .71 (.03)  .41 (.03)  .48 (.03)  .25 (.02) 
Language   .23  (.10)  .53  (.07) 
Border   .92  (.21)  .66  (.18) 
Regional FTA  .43 (.19)  .75 (.17)  .27 (.07)  .23 (.07) 
Landlocked   -.50  (.06)  -.56  (.05) 
Island   .09  (.09)  -.10  (.06) 
Log Area   .18  (.02)  -.01  (.01) 
Com. Colonizer   .39  (.11)  .05  (.10) 
Ex-Colonizer-Colony   .12  (.85)   1.45  (.21) 
Cur. Colony      -1.77 (.79)  -1.23 (.73) 
Currency Union  .31 (.13)  .33 (.12)  -.14 (.37)  .39 (.26) 
R
2 within  .04 .04 .07 .06 
R
2 between  .22 .49 .63 .74 
R
2 overall  .19 .44 .59 .70 
Observations  71,925  71,925  72,654 72,654 
 
Intercepts not recorded.  Standard errors in parentheses.  31
Table 5: Estimating Trade Diversion 
 
￿DIVERT￿ is trade between non-rescheduler and rescheduler 
  Fixed GLS Fixed GLS Fixed GLS 








































































DIVERT Lags=0      .00 .00 .00 .00 









Standard errors in parentheses. 
Regressors not reported: contemporaneous and 15 lags of RENEG; contemporaneous and 5 lags 
of IMF; currency union; log distance; real GDP; real GDP per capita; common language; border; 
regional FTA; landlocked; island; log area; common colonizer; current colony; ex-colony; 
common country; and intercept.   
Number of observations = 219,573 in 11,178 dyads.  32
Table 6: Exports and Imports 
 
Hypothesis Tested  Fixed Effects  Random Effects/GLS 
P(Exporters RENEG=0)  .0000 .0000 
Σ (Exporters RENEG), se  -1.29 (.14)  -1.76 (.14) 
P(Importers RENEG=0)  .0000 .0000 
Σ (Importers RENEG), se  -.83 (.13)  -1.30 (.13) 
P(Exporters RENEG=Importers RENEG)  .63 .65 
Σ(Exporters RENEG)- Σ(Importers RENEG), se  -.46 (.19)  -.46 (.19) 
 
Bilateral real exports.  Regressors not reported: contemporaneous and 15 lags of RENEG for 
both exporting and importing countries; contemporaneous and 5 lags of IMF; currency union; 
log distance; real GDP; real GDP per capita; common language; border; regional FTA; 
landlocked; island; log area; common colonizer; current colony; ex-colony; common country; 
and intercept.   
Number of observations = 375,364 in 20,643 dyads.  33
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Sao Tome & Principe  
Saudi Arabia  
Senegal  
Seychelles  
Sierra Leone  
Singapore  
Slovak Republic  
Slovenia  
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Somalia  
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Wake Islands  
Wallis & Futuna  
West Bank/Gaza Strip  
Yemen Arab Rep.  
Yemen, P.D.R.  
Yemen, Republic of  
Yugoslavia, Fr (Serbia)  
Yugoslavia, Soc. Fed. Rep. 
Zambia  
Zimbabwe Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  OLS (se) 
Log Trade  14.6 3.35 -11.5 25.3   
RENEG  .01 .09  0  1  .56  (.05) 
IMF  .29 .50  0  2  -.28  (.01) 
Log Distance  8.17  .81 3.8 9.4  -1.14  (.01) 
Log Real GDP  47.9 2.67 35.4 58.0  .86  (.003) 
Log GDP p/c  16.0 1.45 10.1 20.9  .39  (.004) 
Language  .23 .42  0  1  .37  (.01) 
Border  .03 .17  0  1  .42  (.03) 
Regional FTA  .01 .11  0  1  .70  (.04) 
Landlocked  .24 .46  0  2  -.39  (.01) 
Island  .34 .54  0  2  .05  (.01) 
Log Area  24.2  3.29 9.6 32.2  -.04  (.002) 
Com. Colonizer  .10 .30  0  1  .20  (.02) 
Cur. Colony  .00 .05  0  1  1.68  (.12) 
Ex-Colonizer-Colony  .02 .14  0  1  1.48  (.04) 
Same Country  .00 .02  0  1  -.79  (.29) 
Currency Union  .01 .12  0  1  1.34  (.04) 
 
219,573 observations.Appendix 3: Simple Correlations 
  Trade RENEG  IMF  CU  Dist.  GDP  GDP 
p/c 






RENEG  . 0 8                    
IMF  -.09  .09                 
Currency Union  .00  -.01  .00                 
Log Distance  -.17  .01  -.00  -.18                
Log Real GDP  .67  .09  -.03  -.14  .18               
Log GDP p/c  .41  .05  -.19  -.13  .11  .38              
Language  -.01  -.01  .01  .19  -.13  -.18  -.05             
Border  .11  -.01  .02  .12  -.42  -.02  -.12  .12           
Regional FTA  .08  -.01  -.02  .08  -.25  -.06  .08  .10  .08         
Landlocked  -.15  -.01  -.01  .04  -.09  -.12  -.21  -.01  .08  -.05        
Island  -.17  -.03  -.08  .01  .15  -.30  .20  .10  -.11  .08  -.19       
Log Area  .27  .05  .07  -.01  .10  .57  -.22  -.11  .10  -.13  .04  -.51      
Com. Colonizer  -.16  -.03  -.00 .26 -.15 -.32 -.18 -.37  .06  .12 .02 .19 -.26       
Cur. Colony  .05  -.0  -.00 .15 .01 -.01 .01 .07  -.01 -.01 -.02 .01 -.03 -.02     
Ex-Colony  .15  .03  -.00 .08 -.02 .08 .06 .19  .03  .00 -.03 -.03 .01 -.05 .31   
Same Country  .02  -.00  -.01 .05 .00 -.00 .02 .03  -.00 -.00 -.01 .02 -.03 -.01 .39 .12 
 
219,573 observations => standard error ≈  .002.References 
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Endnotes 
 
1  For instance, Bulow and Rogoff (1989b, p 44) write ￿￿under fairly general conditions, lending to small countries 
must be supported by the direct sanctions available to creditors￿￿ Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) mention a supergame 
supported by a trigger strategy where default leads to a costly trade war.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp. 349-350) 
write that ￿direct￿ mechanisms to reduce sovereign risk are ￿based on rights of creditors within their own borders, 
rights which allow them to impede or harass the international trade and commerce of any borrower than unilaterally 
defaults ￿ Creditors ￿ can often prevent [a defaulting country] from fully enjoying its gain from trade.￿   
2  My sincere thanks to Ben Hermalin, who deserves most of the credit for this sub-section. 
3  My sincere thanks to Eddie Dekel, who deserves most of the credit for this sub-section. 
4  This includes deviations from the punishment phase. 
5  A similar analysis can be carried out for additional stochastic processes. 
6  Punishment actually follows any period in which anything other than (Pay, Trade) or (Default, Restrict) is played. 
7  One can also allow the punishment phase to be (Pay, Restrict), with suitable modifications. 
8  Less than 1% of all trade sanctions coincide with Paris Club agreements.  Sanctions are typically deployed for 
other reasons, especially to inhibit military intervention, arms proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, human rights 
abuses and so forth; see Herbier (1998) and Schott (1998). 
9  This is also plausible because of the stance of the Paris Club towards short-term debt, which is discussed further 
below. 
10  He also presents a number of mitigating factors and believes that ￿permanent damage to trade could be controlled 
and minimized by a conciliatory defaulter.￿ 
11  For instance, the Export-Import Bank of the United States limits transactions by country, sector (public/private) 
and term, and updated its ￿Country Limitations Schedule￿ in April, June and August of 2001.  Similarly, the UK￿s 
Export Credit Guarantees Department charges different premia and limits its exposure by countries for different 
risks, which include ￿Restrictions on Remittances.￿  More information is available at the URL￿s www.exim.gov and 
www.ecgd.gov.uk. 
12  Dooley (2000) provides a model in which domestic financial intermediation breaks down following a currency 
crisis.  The associated losses provide the incentive for external debt to be serviced.  A modified version of Dooley￿s 
model might predict reduced international trade following debt renegotiation, given the sensitivity of trade to short-
term credit.  Still, Dooley￿s provocative model is not widely accepted; there is little direct evidence of his 
mechanism, and some currency crises seem to be expansionary.  Further, the gravity model used below conditions 
on output, the key channel in Dooley￿s model. 
13  Still, this evidence is disputed by e.g., Ozler (1991).  Further Cole and Kehoe (1997) argue that a tarnished 
reputation may have consequences above and beyond those in the debt arena. 
14  I exploit information from the www.clubdeparis.org heavily in what follows. 
15  Technically speaking, ￿rescheduling￿ amends the terms of a loan so as to stretch out payments due over time, 
while ￿refinancing￿ achieves the same effect by providing a new loan equal to the debt service due; Sevigny (1990).  
For simplicity, I use the term ￿renegotiation.￿ 
16  Most IMF programs associated with Paris Club renegotiations are stand-by or extended arrangements, though 
standard and enhanced structural adjustment programs have also been used. 
17  The ￿London Club￿ handles the renegotiation of international banks￿ exposure to sovereign borrowers. 
18  The Paris Club website indicates that on Dec 31, 1999, developing countries owed $2,550 billion of which $2,071 
was long-term debt; $1,580 (76%) of the latter was public- and publicly-guaranteed.  See 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation.php?BATCH=B03WP01 
19  www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation.php?BATCH=B01WP04#B1 
20  The permanent Paris Club members include: Austria; Australia; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; 
Germany; Ireland; Italy; Japan; the Netherlands; Norway; the Russian Federation; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; the 
UK; and the USA.  Other creditor countries who have participated in Paris Club agreements include: Argentina; 
Brazil; Korea; Israel; Kuwait; Mexico; Morocco; New Zealand; Portugal; Trinidad and Tobago; South Africa; 
Turkey; and the United Arab Emirates. 
21  E.g., Eichengreen and Portes (1995, p. 25). 
22  I note in passing that Paris Club deals do not closely coincide with currency crises.  Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) list the dates of balance of payments crises for twenty countries from 1970 through 1997.  Of the 79 currency 
crises, only six (8%) coincide with Paris Club dates, and only 21 (27%) coincide within two years.  3
 
23  Fixed-effects estimation also precludes estimation coefficients for time-invariant variables, such as the effect of 
distance.  This is a small concern, given that the β  coefficients are nuisances in this exercise. 
24  In practice, the two sets of estimates typically lie close together. 
25  There are a few instances where only FOB imports are available; I then use them instead of CIF imports.  The 
CPI for all urban consumers was extracted from freelunch.com; 1982-84=1. 
26  Since both exports and imports are measured by both countries, there are potentially four measured bilateral trade 
flows: exports from a to b, exports from b to a, imports into a from b, and imports into b from a. 
27  The IFS-based series are calculated by converting national currency GDP figures into dollars at the current dollar 
exchange rate, and then dividing by the US GDP deflator. 
28  The website is: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook. 
29  All FTAs are treated as being equal for simplicity. 
30  A few multilateral official debt renegotiations have been conducted outside the Paris Club forum, e.g., by the 
OECD,  creditor groups, or special task forces.  Information on these has been included from records of the Paris 
Club and Global Development Finance. 
31  Over 93% of all Paris Club agreements are preceded by an IMF program within five years. 
32  There were also 56 uses of the Extended Fund Facility (intended to address more protracted issues), 33 of the 
Structural Adjustment Facility and 70 of its successor Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities, the latter both 
intended for low-income countries.  Both the Supplemental Reserve Facility and the Contingent Credit Line began in 
1997, while the concessional Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility began only in 1999; these are ignored in this 
paper. 
33  Data on IMF programs are available from the IMF￿s Annual Report; I thank Eduardo Borensztein and Jeromin 
Zettlemeyer for assistance in obtaining data on IMF programs. 
34  I note in passing that the log of bilateral real trade volume (the regressand) is not very highly correlated with the 
current accounts of either country (expressed as a percentage of GDP).  In particular, a regression of the volume of 
trade between i and j on the current accounts of countries i and j delivers coefficients of less than .1 and a poor fit. 
35  Thus, the fixed-effect estimation of renegotiations between one and five years ago is derived by adding .09 and -
.23, while the effect of renegotiation between six and ten years ago is simply -.23. 
36  For the Tobit estimation, small values of trade (less than $1,000) are set to zero. 
37  While the linear panel fixed- or random-effects estimates of Table 1 can be computed in a few seconds on a 
Pentium III, the results of Table 3 require over 40 hours to converge. 
38  A number of other researchers have found such variables to be relevant, e.g., Haque, Mathieson, and Mark 
(1997). 
39  I have also used different sets of IVs with similar, though usually weaker results. 
40  Indeed, there may even be a net positive effect, though the data speak quietly on this issue. 
41  The results are always sensible (bigger renegotiations tend to dampen trade more, while countries that were 
recently rescheduled or have frequently had their debts rescheduled tend to trade less), and sometimes significant, 
especially with the GLS estimator. 
42  Also, adding the onset of arrears (and its lags) to the default equation does not affect my key conclusions. 